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A recent article in the New England 10urnal of Medicine on "The
Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly III Patients"! I) encourages
non-treatment of patients, 2) confuses the right of privacy with a patient's
decision to refuse a treatment gravely burdensome to himself, 3)
encourages "living will" statutes which lack the prerequisites for informed
consent and are otherwise objectionable, and 4) states that a physician
cannot participate in suicide because " .. . this is contrary to the law."
However, it omits noting the inherent immorality of assisted suicide and
the fundamental obligations of physicians entrusted with recommending
therapy to protect and promote physical, mental, and emotional health.
Physicians have had , and will continue to have, professional obligations ,
moral duties, and ethical responsibilities when treating each and every
patient. For many physicians, these responsibilities are rooted in religious
principles, yet other doctors lacking formal religious affiliations or beliefs
affirm them as well. The history of their broad acceptance is reflected in
the Oath of Hippocrates, the Declaration of Geneva, the Nuremberg
Code, and elsewhere. It is under the guidance of their standards that
medicine has achieved its greatest advancements.
The N ElM article states "[t]he patient's right to maJ<.e decisions about
his or her medical care is clear. That right, grounded in both common law
and the constitutional right to privacy, includes the right to refuse life
sustaining treatment...". While the Constitution expressly protects certain
specified privacy interests such as the Fourth Amendment's guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures, it recognizes no general, allencompassing right to privacy. In our system of jurisprudence, it is proper
for the courts to interpret the Constitution in accordance with the values
and principles rooted in its language and history. However, when new
constitutional "rights" are created without regard to any value or principle
that is fairly discoverable in the Constitution, those "rights" are
illegitimate. 2
Roe v. Wade,) the 1973 decision of the Supreme Court that recognized a
"right" of privacy sufficiently broad to legalize abortion-on-demand from
fertilization through birth, is a definitive example of illegitimate judicial
review. 4 This decision, which serves as the cornerstone for extending the
"right" of privacy to other life issues at other stages of human development,
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is an unprincipled and unconstitutional display of "raw judicial power."5
While the rule of law requires our recognition of Roe's "legal" force, our
consciences and professional integrity compel rejection of its moral force .
Upholding Sanctity of Life

Moreover, the common law right of a competent patient to refuse
medical treatment does not diminish the duty of the physician to uphold
the sanctity of life when advising the patient as to the appropriate course of
treatment. Neither does it diminish the physician's responsibility to the
incompetent patient. Indeed. the physician's primary obligation is to
preserve life and "do no harm."
Human life is special. For Jews. Christians. Moslems and other
monotheists. human life is sacred because every human being is created in
the image and likeness of God . The imperatives of personal and societal
survival. the desire for civilization, and the universal relevance of the
Golden Rule dictate respect for human life for all , including those who
believe neither in religion nor in God . Reverence and care must be given to
each and every human being, regardless of sex. race. color. creed , or
whether he or she is in the womb or in a nursing home. handicapped or
nondisabled, comatose or communicative. young or old. because each
human being is unique and irreplaceable.
What effects does this awareness of the special ness of every human life
and the uniqueness of each human being have on a physician? Let us begin
by briefly reviewing the routine in which a physician practices when a
patient comes into his care. He obtains a history. does a physical exam,
then laboratory studies, perhaps images of internal structures through the
use of X-rays, ultra-sound, or radio-isotope studies and biopsy when
needed . Data is collected. Relative to training, experience, and knowledge
of medical literature, as well as support through appropriate consultation,
the physician
.
. makes a diagnosis. Therapy is then recommended based on
that diagnosIs.

,

A wareness of Limitations

The physician must always be aware of the limitations of the expertise he
possesses. These limitations are individualized in terms of one's
knowledge, intelligence, and reasoning ability. Further, these limitations
are intrinsically related to the basic sciences underlying the practice of
medicine: biochemistry, physics, etc. Identification of these limitations
helps the physician to be conscious of the degree of certitude, or lack of
certitude, which exists for the diagnosis, treatment and prognosis for this
particular patient.
Once a diagnosis is made, other factors must be considered. Should a
patient have more than one serious pathologic process, therapy needs to be
altered accordingly. For example, a patient with disseminated oat-cell
carcinoma of the lung can suffer a myocardial infarction. The likelihood of
such malignancy being fatal and even interfering with healing generally
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would alter the therapy recommended for simply the heart disease. Or for
a nother patient who has already had extensive treatment but remains ilL
perhaps with complications from therapy already used, decisions
regarding further treatment may be altered. For example , s hould the
further treatment be intravenous medication which is toxic to a vein, and
all the more readily accessible veins have been used , the di sco mfort and
potential ri sk for using a deeper ve in ma y influence recommendations by
the doctor and decisions of the patient. In a ll such instances , the sole
variable is efficacy of medical treatment and never any quality-of-life
consideration.
Decisions to use or not use a treatment are otten consIdered aCCOrdIng 10
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" means. "Ordinary" and "extraordinary"
means represent constructs by some ethicists enabling an understanding of
the decision by the palienr himseltwho elects to use or not use a particular
treatment. "Ordinary" means include any treatment, medication , or
operation which offers a reasonable hope of benefit without requiring
heroic virtue or causing excessive pain, expense , or other grave burden to
the patient himself. The patient must use all available "ordinary" means to
preserve his life. I ncluded in the category of "o rdinary" means are keeping
the patient on a suitable mattress , maintaining an appropriate thermal
environment, keeping the airway patent , providing water and nutrition,
providing an exit for stool and urine , and using other readily available
efficacious therapies.
Heroic Virtue Required

"Extraordinary" means include any treatment, medication or operation
that would require heroic virtue, or be gravely burdensome. While
ordinarily the patient is not obligated to employ "extraordinary" means,
he may decide to do so. Such a course could constitute an act of heroic
virtue . "Extraordinary" means cannot be foregone ip order to kill the
patient or to advance other immoral ends. Moreover, medical progress
renders today's "extraordinary" means tomorrow's "ordinary" means .
In the religious context in which "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means
originated, they are limited to particular criteria that may (not must) be
employed by the palienr himself to ascertain his moral duty to utilize
specific medical treatments. In secular and legal parlance, however, they
have come to provide a pretext for coercive persuasion to accept the
imposition of yet another euthanasia subterfuge - i.e., "passive" euthanasia
and, failing that, for its involuntary application.
When the patient is unable to speak for himself, the decision regarding
treatment becomes more complicated. Then the physician must obtain a
proxy-type consent. This should be as close as possible to the instruction
the patient himself, if able, would state. Almost always the patient has a
close family tie with a spouse, a parent, or a child. As a result of these
bonds , when the patient is unable to communicate for himself, the
physician has an obligation to communicate with the family. Pertinent
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Linacre Quarterly

info rmation from relatives a nd close friends is extremely helpful at these
times. Communication with loved ones offers the best chance for
perso nali zed care for th e patient unable to speak for himself. In no
instance s hould the patient's ri g ht to life be violated in favor of any proxy's
directives, nor should any proxy be permitted to deny the patient lifeprese rvi ng treatment.

Orders Must Be Precise
Decisions and written orders to us e or not use a treatment for a patient
must be as prec ise as possible. A decision to perform or not perform an
operation, to administer or not administer a blood transfusion, to use or
not use a particular antibiotic, can be made only after the facts and details
have bee n obtained through a thorough and complete medical evaluation
of the patie nt.
Generalizations or non-specific terms such as surgery, antibiotics, or
blood pro ducts are classifications which are too broad for application to a
particular patient. "No-code" is a prime example of an ambiguous order
accepted by ph ys icians and courts. But we question if thi s lack of precision
of thought resulting in mUltiple variations of non-treatment has a place in
medical practice. Does it mean no maintenance of an airway, or no
intubation, or no ventilatory support. or no cardiac resuscitation, as well
as no new or additional therapy') Such broad, non-specific orders are not
acceptable on other occas io ns of standard medical practice. Why are they
here'! Furthermore, realizing th e weakness of human nature, once the
course ha s been plotted by a "no-code,"' ''slow code," or a DNR (Do not
resuscitate) order. there is a tendency to preclude, eliminate, or reduce
other kinds of "ordinary" treatment. such as visits by physicians and care
given by nurses.
The privilege to treat our fellow man includes ~'esponsibil i t i es,
obligations and duties. There is a duty to help patients obtain the morally
licit m edical treatment they require . There is a responsibility to understand
that the concept of "extraordinary" means is neither universal nor openended. There is an obligation to preserve life when the physician cannot yet
cure. Those who del iver medical and nursing care must never kill the
patient either intentionally or through culpable negligence . If this occurs ,
th e responsibility or duty associated with the privilege of treat ing our
fellow man is violated.
Accord ing to a letter by Pless", not only was the Bloomington, Indiana
"Baby Doe ," who had esophageal atresia and Down's syndrome, denied
medicall y indicated surgery, but also he " .. . was given phenobarbital (5
mg) and morphine (2.5 mg) as needed for pain and restlessness." While the
administration of th ese and other drugs can be morall y and medically
acceptable to relieve pain, when given at 5-10 times the dose ordinarily
needed for this , the question is "Why such a high dose?" Did thirst and
starvat ion cause this infant to be so very uncomfortable? Or was this high
November, 1986
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dose intended to depress ventilation and hasten death? The behavior of
these physicians was professionally unacceptable.
Withdrawing or withholding essential means of sustaining life, such as
food, water and protection from exposure is morally - if not always
"legally"-tantamount to murder, and professionally unacceptable for one
who is privileged to help the sick. Prior to the death of Karen Quinlan, to
have stopped feeding her, to have failed to treat life-threatening infections
with antibiotics, or not to have kept her room warm, would have resulted
in hastening her death. It would have been the moral equivalent of murder.
Physician Responsible for Best Medical Care

The physician has a responsibility to provide the best possible medical
care for the patient. Yet, he must also understand the emotional changes
that accompany physical illness and provide support and hope when the
situation is interpreted by the patient or family to be overwhelming.
Even though the ultimate responsibility for the decision regarding
medical treatment generally lies with the patient himself, commonly the
physician is asked to provide guidance and direction . At these times the
physician must be mindful of the privilege and obligation he has to
safeguard the life of the patient, as well as the lives of others who may be
endangered as a result of such decisions.
The physician-patient relationship has may attributes, any of which can
be abused by either the physician or the patient. One that can be abused
easily by the physician revolves around the position the powerful physician
holds in comparison to the weak and ill patient. He must be mindful of this
as he makes decisions and recommends treatments for a patient. The
potential for abuse increases when the patient is unresponsive,
unconscious , unable to communicate, or at the ebbing of life when the
patient is so very defenseless.
,
When the patient deems a specific treatment "extraordinary" and directs
that it not be used , that directive applies solely to that specific treatment
and in all cases the patient must continue to receive all "ordinary" care. At
all times, including when dying, the patient must be treated as a human
person who has rights. When a treatment is contraindicated or no longer
indicated , we must realize that we are not "letting him or her die;" rather,
we realize that that particular treatment is of no use in the struggle against
death. Death may occur despite our best efforts to preserve life, but we
shall never be death's expediters.
The N £J M article lists four categories for "The Incompetent Patient":
I. " Patients with brain death." The lack of scientific validation for " brain death"
criteria and the questionable morality of what is occurring in this area have
been discussed in depth in recent publications 7.8. Be it sufficient here to point
out how the a uthors of the N £J M article are willing to call a patient "dead"
when there is "irreversible cessation 01 all junctions of the brain ... " in
contrast to their following category of "persistent vegetative state," when the
"
neocortex is largely and irreversibly destroyed." (Emphasis added).
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Need less to say, none of the brain-related criteria for d ea th a re adequate for
the dia gnosis of dest ructi on of the brain, much less dea th of the perso n.
2. " Pati ents in a persistent vegeta ti ve sta te." Cra nford, a nd very lik ely a ll the
a uthors of t he N EJ M article, are fami liar with Sgt. Da vid Mac k of
M inneapolis9, who was d iagnosed as being in such condition. After 22 months
of bein g unrespon sive, those taking ca re of him noticed eye mo ve ment , on ly
then to find out from Sgt. Mack that he had bee n aware of th ose around him
for at lease six months before anyo ne knew th at he was a nything other tha n in
"a pers istent vegetative state." Would they now agree tha t it wo uld have been
accepta ble to have wit hheld nutrition and hydration from Sgt. Mack?
3. "Severely and irreve rsibly demented patients." The word "severely" wa s not
defined by th e a uthors a nd therefore is su bject to excess ive ly wide
interpretation. " Irrevers ibly" cannot be empirica ll y determined. lo It is not
app ropri a te to ap pl y such a dverbs ca tego ri zin g patients. Whil e th e authors
speak to maki ng the patient comfo rta bl e, where are the studies s how ing the
patient dying of dehydration a nd starvati on is comfortable? Nor is comfort a
substitute for life, much less a rati onale for dea th .
4. "E ld er ly patients wit h permanent mild impa irment of competence." To be in
such a state does not requi re attainme nt of age. Fu rthermore, "elderly" in itself
is not a precise term . In fact, o ne dictionary defines it as " beyo nd middle age."
Medicine should not accept such vacuo us philosop hica l specula ti ons.

The diffic ulties are compounded when an individual has previously
executed a "living will", indicating an approach to non-therapy. A major
deficiency in a "living will" is that it is executed without the information
and data needed to make such a decision and accordingly, violates the
fundamental principles of informed consent. The "living will" decreases
the possibility of adequate testing and treating diseases that would
otherwise be diagnosed and treated. Furthermore, while attempting to
"simplify" proxy directives, it does this only in a death-embracing man ner.
Physicians must exclude their own narrow self-interest when making
decisions or when asking the patient or the person whose consent is legally
required for a particular treatment. One can readily appreciate that
personal advantages or disadvantages regarding legal lia bility, prolonged
or inconvenient hours required to treat, or compromised compensation
from a Medicare-Medicaid-welfare patient, can influence a physician's
decisions. The physician must always keep the rights and responsibilities
of the patient in compliance with sound medical ethics foremost in the
decision-making process.
Member of Health Care Team
A physician does not carry out his duties and responsibilities in a
vacuum. The physician is a member of a health care team including nurses,
respiratory therapists, administrators, phys ical therapists, social workers,
pastoral care personnel, secretaries, and others working in the hospital or
treatment setting. Each and everyone of these is a human being with his
own values, privileges and responsibilities in terms of delivering medical
care to another human being. Each one has power and strength in relation
to his own intentions, training, and personality. Each one has deficiencies
and frailties . Each one must understand the strengths, weaknesses and
November, 1986
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limitations of the ill patient , especially when the patient is unresponsive,
comatose, or otherwise unable to communicate through spoken or written
language or when he or she happens to be at an ebb in his or her own life.
That human life is sacred must be foremost as medical and nursing care
is administered. Human life is a basic good. The right to life is a
fundamental God-given right. Without life there are no other rights or
goods for a human being. When medical and nursing care are delivered
without identifying the sacredness of human life and the right to live, the
priorities are radically different. When society establishes that human life
is not sacred and man has dominion over life and death , such as the case in
abortion , infanticide, and euthanasia, then not only is the physicianpatient relationship altered , but so are all other relationships between
human beings.
There is a large and growing number in society, including physicians ,
who regard life as sacred because it is a gift from Almighty God. For each
person, there is a life span on earth determined by God. Human beings
have obligations toward themselves and each other to respect this lifespan. The basis for these obligations are the Judeo-Christian beliefs which
were included in the very foundation of our country. Slipping away from
them has seriously injured "the land of the free , and the home of the
brave." There is a way to practice medicine and to live together, still
maintaining respect for human life, without the weak being the victims of
the strong.
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